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PARTIES TO APPEAL
Barbara B. Uzelac, wife of Louis J. Uzelac, deceased.
Allyson Drew Uzelac, daughter of Louis J. Uzelac
S. Brooke Uzelac Mageras, daughter of Louis J. Uzelac
Joseph G. Uzelac, Jr., successor Personal Representative of the Estate.*

* The successor personal representative is not participating in this appeal. To explain:
Following the death of Joseph G. Uzelac in December 2003, the trial court appointed his
son, Joseph G. Uzelac, Jr., as the successor personal representative of the estate. R.13071309. Immediately following the original court of appeals decision in March 2005,
Joseph Jr. filed a notice of resignation. R. 1461-63. At a hearing on November 17, 2005,
the trial court refused to accept Joseph, Jr.'s resignation. R. 1532-34. Even so, Joseph Jr.
has chosen not to participate in these proceedings since he filed his resignation. The
Children as "interested persons" and as intervenors are therefore opposing Barbara's
appeal. R. 1529-31.
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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code §78-22(4).
ISSUES FOR REVIEW; STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Where the personal representative distributed property to the residuary
beneficiaries of the decedent's will prior to the trial of the wife's claim to part of her
deceased husband's estate, and where that distribution made the estate effectively
insolvent/ did the trial court err when it once again refused to order the return of estate
property so the personal representative could pay Barbara B. Uzelac the general pecuniary
devise her husband intended her to receive? Preserved at R. 1626.
Standard of Review: The Court decided the issue as a matter of law based on its
application of undisputed facts to Utah Code Sections 75-3-1004 and 75-3-1006.
Therefore, the standard of review is correction of error. See Hansen v. Hansen, Case No.
970321-CA, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 958 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah App. 1998).
Issue No. 2: Where the decedent's wife has been forced to wait over seven years since
her husband's death to receive her devise from the estate, did the trial court err when it
denied her interest on the amount of her general pecuniary devise as required by Utah
Code Section 75-3-904? Preserved at R.1627.

1

R.1528 (Personal Representative's explanation of his attempted resignation;
"because the estate has no money").
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Standard of Review: The trial court decided the issue as a matter of law based on its
legal characterization that it was interpreting an antenuptial agreement, rather than a will.
Therefore, the standard of review is correction of error. See Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d
at 933.
Issue No. 3: Where the personal representative acknowledged that the devise of "all my
property" to Louis' Children operated as would a residuary devise, did the trial court err
when it held that the devise to the decedent's Children was a "general devise?" Preserved
atR.1633.
Standard of Review: The Court decided the issue as a matter of law based on its
application of the undisputed facts to Utah Code Section 75-3-902. Therefore, the
standard of review is correction of error. See Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d at 933.
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS etal
Utah Code §75-1-201(24). General definitions.
Subject to additional definitions contained in the subsequent chapters that are applicable
to specific chapters, parts, or sections, and unless the context otherwise requires, in this
code: . . .
(24) "Interested person" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors,
beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or
the estate of a decedent, ward, or protected person. It also includes persons having
priority for appointment as personal representative, other fiduciaries representing
interested persons, a settlor of a trust, if living, or the settlor's legal representative, if any,
if the settlor is living but incapacitated. The meaning as it relates to particular persons
may vary from time to time and shall be determined according to the particular purposes
of, and matter involved in, any proceeding.
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Utah Code §75-2-510. Incorporation by reference
A writing in existence when a will is executed may be incorporated by reference if the
language of the will manifests this intent and describes the writing sufficiently to permit
its identification.
Utah Code §75-2-601. Scope
In the absence of a finding of a contrary intention, the rules of construction in this part
control the construction of a will.
Utah Code §75-2-602. Will construed to pass all property and after-acquired
property
A will is construed to pass all property the testator owns at death and all property acquired
by the estate after the testator's death.
Utah Code §75-2-604. Failure of testamentary provision
(1) Except as provided in Section 75-2-603 [the antilapse provision], a devise, other than
a residuary devise, that fails for any reason becomes a part of the residue.
(2) Except as provided in Section 75-2-603 [the antilapse provision], if the residue is
devised to two or more persons, the share of a residuary devisee that fails for any reason
passes to the other residuary devisee, or to other residuary devisees in proportion to the
interest of each in the remaining part of the residue.
Utah Code §75-3-105(1). Proceedings affecting devolution and administration Jurisdiction of subject matter.
(1) Persons interested in decedents' estates may apply to the registrar for determination in
the informal proceedings provided in this chapter and may petition the court for orders in
formal proceedings within the court's jurisdiction, including, but not limited to those
described in this chapter. The court may hear and determine formal proceedings involving
administration and distribution of decedents' estates after notice to interested persons in
conformity with Section 75-1-401. Persons notified are bound though less than all
interested persons may have been given notice.

Page 3

Utah Code §75-3-106. Scope of proceedings - Proceedings independent - Exception.
(1) Unless supervised administration as described in Part 5 of this chapter is involved:
(a) Each proceeding before the court or registrar is independent of any other
proceeding involving the same estate.
(b) Petitions for formal orders of the court may combine various requests for relief
in a single proceeding if the orders sought may be finally granted without delay.
Except as required for proceedings which are particularly described by other
sections of this chapter, no petition is defective because it fails to embrace all
matters which might then be the subject of a final order.
(c) Proceedings for probate of wills or adjudications of no will may be combined
with proceedings for appointment of personal representatives.
(d) A proceeding for appointment of a personal representative is concluded by an
order making or declining the appointment.
Utah Code §75-3-902. Distribution - Order in which assets appropriated Abatement.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2) below and except as provided in connection with
the share of the surviving spouse who elects to take an elective share, shares of
distributees abate, without any preference or priority as between real and personal
property, in the following order:
(a) property not disposed of by the will;
(b) residuary devises;
© general devises;
(d) specific devises.
For purposes of abatement, a general devise charged on any specific property or fund is a
specific devise to the extent of the value of the property on which it is charged, and upon
the failure or insufficiency of the property on which it is charged, a general devise to the
extent of the failure or insufficiency. Abatement within each classification is in
proportion to the amounts of property each of the beneficiaries would have received if
full distribution of the property had been made in accordance with the terms of the will.
(2) If the will expresses an order of abatement, or if the testamentary plan or the express
or implied purpose of the devise would be defeated by the order of abatement stated in
Subsection (1), the shares of the distributees abate as may be found necessary to give
effect to the intention of the testator.
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(3) If the subject of a preferred devise is sold or used incident to administration,
abatement shall be achieved by appropriate adjustments in, or contribution from, other
interests in the remaining assets.
Utah Code §75-3-904. Interest on general pecuniary devise.
General pecuniary devises bear interest at the legal rate beginning one year after the first
appointment of a personal representative until payment, unless a contrary intent is
indicated by the will.
Utah Code §75-3-909. Improper distribution - Liability of distributee.
Unless the distribution or payment no longer can be questioned because of adjudication,
estoppel, or limitation, a distributee of property improperly distributed or paid, or a
claimant who was improperly paid, is liable to return the property improperly received
and its income since distribution if he has the property. If he does not have the property,
then he is liable to return the value as of the date of disposition of the property improperly
received and its income and gain received by him.
Utah Code §75-3-1004. Liability of distributees to claimants
After assets of an estate have been distributed and subject to Section 75-3- 1006, an
undischarged claim not barred may be prosecuted in a proceeding against one or more
distributees. No distributee shall be liable to claimants for amounts received as exempt
property, homestead or family allowances, or for amounts in excess of the value of his
distribution as of the time of distribution. As between distributees, each shall bear the cost
of satisfaction of unbarred claims as if the claim had been satisfied in the course of
administration. Any distributee who shall have failed to notify other distributees of the
demand made upon him by the claimant in sufficient time to permit them to join in any
proceeding in which the claim was asserted against him loses his right of contribution
against other distributees.
Utah Code §75-3-1006(1). Limitations on actions and proceedings against
distributees.
(1) Unless previously adjudicated in a formal testacy proceeding or in a proceeding
settling the accounts of a personal representative or otherwise barred, the claim of any
claimant to recover from a distributee who is liable to pay the claim, and the right of any
heir or devisee or of a successor personal representative acting in their behalf, to recover
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property improperly distributed or the value thereof from any distributee is barred at the
later of:
(a) as to a claim by a creditor of the decedent, one year after the decedent's death;
and
(b) as to any other claimant and any heir or devisee, at the later of:
(I) three years after the decedent's death; or
(ii) one year after the time of distribution thereof.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the proper interpretation of a wife's benefits under her
husband's will where the will incorporated by reference the husband and wife's
antenuptial agreement. In April 2004, following a one day trial, the trial court ruled that
the wife (Barbara B. Uzelac or "Barbara") was not entitled to any benefits in her
husband's ("Louis's") estate other than a life estate in her husband's home. R. 1340-48.
Barbara appealed. This Court reversed the trial court's interpretation of the
antenuptial agreement, it vacated other orders of the trial court adverse to Barbara's
claims for relief, and it remanded for the calculation of Barbara's rights as a beneficiary
of the estate. In re Estate of Uzelac, No. 20040356-CA, f 14,1ffll5-2l, 2005 UT App 234,
114 P.3d 1164 (Utah App. 2005) (amended decision).
On remand, the trial court found that Barbara was entitled to $230,660.90 as a
beneficiary of the estate; however, the trial court denied Barbara's motion to recover
estate property distributed prior to the determination of her general pecuniary devise,
denied Barbara's claim to pre-distribution interest on her general pecuniary devise, and
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ruled that the decedent's children were general rather than residuary beneficiaries of the
estate. R. 1754-55. Ruling the children's devise was a general devise was not necessary
to the trial court's other two rulings. However, this ruling will be important on remand
because it will affect the rights of the parties regarding the abatement of devises to pay
Barbara's beneficial interests.2
The trial court entered its judgment on September 11, 2006. R. 1757-58. Barbara
filed her Notice of Appeal on September 19,2006. R.1771-72.3 On September 27, 2006,
the Supreme Court transferred the case to the Court of Appeals, effective twenty days
thereafter. R.1774.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
When Barbara and Louis Uzelac ("Louis") married in April 1976, they had been
friends for over twenty-five years. R.1413; T.18-19.4 From 1948 until Ruth's (Louis'
first wife's) death in 1971, she and Barbara had been close friends. Id. During that span,
several times each year, Ruth, Louis, Barbara, and Barbara's first husband attended
bridge club socials. T.19. After Ruth's death, Barbara's husband died in 1974.

2

Thus, Barbara seeks reversal of this ruling in this appeal.

3

Barbara filed a "Notice of Appeal (Protective)" on September 8, 2006. R. 175960. Following the entry of the Judgment, she filed her Notice of Appeal on September
19, 2006. In response to Barbara's Notice of Appeal (Protective), the Children filed a
cross appeal on September 11, 2006. Rl 768-69.
4

All citations to "T." are to the transcript at R. 1413. The cites are to the page
numbers of that transcript.
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Thereafter, the widower courted the widow. T.27-28. Barbara and Louis married on
April 14, 1976 and were happily married for 23 years until Louis' death on November 6,
1999. T.20-21; Trial Exhibit 2, %L, 1J4 at 2.
Prior to their marriage, Barbara and Louis executed an antenuptial agreement
(entitled and thus hereafter referred to as the "Ante Nuptial Agreement"). Trial Exhibit 1;
Trial Exhibit 2, ffifl-2 at 1-2. If the marriage had ended in divorce, Barbara and Louis
agreed that they would equitably divide "all property, real, personal, and mixed, acquired
by the parties" during the marriage by agreement or by court order. Antenuptial
Agreement ^[5 at 2. But if one spouse survived the other, then they agreed that the
survivor would receive "all property, real, personal, or mixed, acquired by the parties"
during the marriage. Id.
When Louis died, he was survived by Barbara, his two children of his first
marriage, Allyson Drew Uzelac and S. Brooke Uzelac Mageras (collectively the
"Children"), and two grandchildren by Ms. Mageras, Angela Marie Mageras and Amanda
Mageras (collectively the "Grandchildren"). T. Exh. 2 at 2, f4. Louis left a will and a
codicil. T. Exh. 4. After payment of debts and administrative expenses, he devised "all
of [his] property" to his two Children, Brooke Mageras and Allyson Uzelac. He then
stated that Barbara "is to receive per the terms of the anti(sic) nuptial agreement executed
on March 25, 1976 . . .." Id. at 1-2. He then devised $5,000 to each of his two
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grandchildren, Angela Marie Mageras and Amanda Mageras, plus any amounts in
accounts he had created for their benefit. Id.; Will at 2; modified by Codicil at 1.
Louis named his brother, Joseph G. Uzelac, personal representative of the estate.
Id. at 3. The probate court formally appointed Joseph, Sr. personal representative of the
estate on December 7, 1999. R.13-14. Thereafter, Barbara attempted to recover the
benefits that Louis intended she receive, but she was unsuccessful. By the fall of 2003,
the only remaining issues revolved around the meaning of "acquired by the parties" in
paragraph 5 of the Ante Nuptial Agreement and how Barbara would be paid her
entitlements under Louis' Will. T. Exh. 1 at 2.
Trial was held on October 2003. R. 1413. In preparing for that trial, Barbara
discovered that the personal representative had distributed all remaining real property in
the estate to Louis' Children (subject to a life estate in Barbara). R.912-917; T. Exh.21.
By doing so, the personal representative left the estate effectively insolvent. R.1528,
supra footnote 1. R. 1509-10. On July 29, 2006, Barbara moved the trial court for an
order directing the Children to reconvey the distributed property to the estate. R.912-17.
The trial court denied that motion in the week preceding the trial. R. 1080-84. In so
doing, the trial court effectively destroyed Barbara's rights under the Will since the assets
remaining in the estate were insufficient to pay her devise.
After trial, the trial court further destroyed the benefit Louis and Barbara intended
Barbara to receive by adding the word "together" after the terms "acquired by the parties"
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in paragraph 5 of the Antenuptial Agreement. T. Exh. 1; R.1345. Since property had been
acquired during the marriage separately, the trial court's ruling meant Barbara received
nothing from Louis' estate despite his devise to her in his Will. R. 1343. Barbara then
appealed those rulings. R.1366-67; R.1403-04.
After the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, on remand, the trial court ruled
that Barbara was entitled to $230,660.90. In re Estate ofUzelac, ^[14,ffl[15-21;R.1757.
However, the trial court once again destroyed the benefit Louis intended Barbara to
receive by denying Barbara's motion to recover the property distributed to the Children
prior to the determination of Barbara's rights under the Will. R. 1750-1758. Since the
estate remained insolvent, Barbara received no assets from the estate and Louis' Children
are unjustly enriched by receiving a residuary devise of all of the estate's property prior to
the adjudication of Barbara's entitlements as a beneficiary of the estate. Barbara again
appeals the trial court's rulings. R. 1771-73.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court refused to order the recovery of the distributed property on the basis
that "no proceeding against either of the distributees [the Children] requested by (sic) to
be recovered has been instituted." R.1755. However, the Uniform Probate Code
authorizes "proceedings" by filing petitions and motions for formal orders, requiring only
that notice of the petition or hearing be given to "interested persons." Utah Code §75-3105, §75-3-106, §75-1-401. Barbara did that. R.912-917. Thus, the trial court's ruling
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was erroneous and should be reversed, and the Children should be ordered to reconvey
the property to the estate.
The trial court denied pre-distribution interest to Barbara on the amount of her
devise on the basis that the trial was an action on the "interpretation of an Ante Nuptial
Agreement rather than a general pecuniary devise . . .." R. 1754-55. That ruling violated
the law of the case doctrine based on the trial court's initial decision and the fact that
decision was affirmed on appeal. R.1345; In re Estate ofUzelac, supra, ^[14, ffl|15-21.
Moreover, under Utah law, a testator may "incorporate by reference" "a writing in
existence when the will is executed." Utah Code §75-2-510. As a result the "writing"
becomes part of the will. When the trial court determined that the amount due Barbara
was $230,660.90, it found that Barbara was entitled to that amount as a beneficiary of the
will. Thus, she received a general pecuniary devise. By law, Barbara became entitled to
interest on her pecuniary devise at the legal rate one year following the appointment of
the personal representative until she is paid. Utah Code §75-3-904. The trial court's
ruling was erroneous and should be reversed with instructions to add pre-distribution
interest at the rate of 10% per annum until the devise has been paid.
The trial court ruled that the distributed property was "distributed as a general
devise to the daughters . . .." because "Restatement of Property (Wills), §5.1" states "a
devise of "all my property" is a general devise. R.1754, ^2 and footnote 1. Section 5.1
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does not state this. Restatement (Third) of Property, Wills and Donative Transactions,
§5.1 (1999, current through September 2006). Rather, the Comments to Section 5.1 state:
Any devise that is payable out of the general assets of the estate is a general
devise. For example, a devise of "all of my property" or of "all of my
personal property" is a general devise, as is a devise of "one-half of my
estate."
§5.1, Comment c. General devises. This Comment means that a devise of "all of my
estate" is a "general devise" as opposed to a "specific devise," but it can and most often is
a general residuary devise. Under Section 5.1 (4), "a residuary devise is a testamentary
disposition of property of the testator's net probate estate not disposed by a specific,
general, or demonstrative devise." Id. When Louis devised "all of [his] property" to the
Children, he made a devise of his "net probate estate" after the devises to Barbara and the
Grandchildren were paid. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should reverse this
erroneous ruling and hold that the Children are residuary beneficiaries of Louis5 estate.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Court of Appeals Should Order the Children to Reconvey the Distributed
Property to the Estate.
The trial court erred when it held that no proceeding had been filed against the

distributees, asserting instead that Barbara filed her petition against the estate. The trial
court apparently believed that a new lawsuit must be filed naming the distributees as
defendants. However, "interested persons" initiate "proceedings" by filing a "petition"
and giving notice to all other interested persons.
Section 75-3-1006 provides in relevant part:
(1) . . . [T]he right of any heir or devisee or of a successor personal representative
acting in their behalf, to recover property improperly distributed or the value
thereof from any distributee is barred at the later of:
(b) as to any other claimant and any heir or devisee, at the later of:
(i) three years after the decedent's death; or
(ii) one year after the time of distribution thereof.
Since Barbara acted within two months of the actual date of the distribution, her claim for
recovery was timely. See T.Exh.21 and R.912-17.
While an estate is open, Section 75-3-909 addresses the recovery of an improper
distribution. It provides:
Unless the distribution or payment no longer can be questioned because of
adjudication, estoppel, or limitation, a distributee of property improperly
distributed or paid, or a claimant who was improperly paid, is liable to
return the property improperly received and its income since distribution if
he has the property. If he does not have the property, then he is liable to
return the value as of the date of disposition of the property improperly
received and its income and gain received by him.
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Utah Code §75-3-909. Because the distributee must "return the property improperly
received," the return would be to the estate that is still open and subject to administration,
and not to other distributees or claimants.
When Barbara filed her petition,5 "Barbara Uzelac's Motion for an Order Directing
Beneficiaries to Return Estate Property to the Estate, or in the Alternative Voiding the
Deed of Distribution," she brought a separate proceeding against the Children. "Each
proceeding before the court or registrar is independent of any other proceeding involving
the same estate." Utah Code §75-3-106. Section 75-3-105(1) granted this right to
Barbara.
(1) Persons interested in decedents' estates [Barbara] may apply to the
registrar for determination in the informal proceedings provided in this
chapter and may petition the court for orders in formal proceedings within
the court's jurisdiction [the petition for recovery of the distributed property],
including, but not limited to those described in this chapter. The court may
hear and determine formal proceedings involving administration and
distribution of decedents' estates after notice to interested persons in
conformity with Section 75-1-401 [notice to Ms. Mageras and Ms. Uzelac;
not the filing of a separate lawsuit].
Utah Code §75-3-105(1) (emphasis added; bracketed material added).
As Louis' surviving spouse and a devisee of his will, Barbara was and is a "person
interested" in his estate. Utah Code §75-1-201(24). Section 75-3-909, Section 75-31004, and Section 75-3-1006 are all part of Chapter 3 of Title 75. Thus, Section 75-3-105

5

The Utah Uniform Probate Code broadly defines a "petition" as "a written
request to the court of an order after notice." Utah Code §75-1-201(37).
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authorizes Barbara to file a petition seeking relief described in Section 75-3-909, Section
75-3-1004, and Section 75-3-1006. Further, even were there no express authority under
those code sections, Section 75-3-105 authorizes Barbara to file a motion "involving
administration and distribution of decedent's estates." Utah Code §75-3-105(1). The
only requirement that Barbara must follow is to provide notice to interested persons in
conformity with Section 75-1-401. Utah Code §75-3-105.
In her prayer for relief, Barbara sought "an Order requiring the beneficiaries of the
estate to return distributed property to the estate by executing the deed attached as Exhibit
A." R.912 at 1. Exhibit A was a quit claim deed that stated in relevant part:
Grantors, pursuant to the Order of the Court on
, 2003, in the
Matter of the Estate of Louis J. Uzelac, State of Utah, Third District Court,
Probate No. 993901690, and in order to reverse the Personal Representative
Deed dated May 29, 2003 and recorded on June 4, 2003 in Book 8811 Page
2614 Entry No. 8675566, hereby quit claim, transfer, and convey, without
warranty, to Joseph Uzelac, Personal Representative of the Estate of Louis
J. Uzelac, grantee, the following described real property in Salt Lake
County, Utah:
R. 915-17. The deed provided for signatures by Barbara, and each of the Children.
Barbara served the pleading on counsel for the Children, who had previously
appeared on their behalf in estate proceedings. See e.g. R. 102-03, R.134. This provided
the notice required by Section 75-1-401.6 Indeed, in response to Barbara's motion to

6

Section 75-1-401 sets forth notice requirements "except for specific notice
requirements as otherwise provided .. .." Utah Code §75-1-401(1). When a probate case
is litigated, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("URCP") governs notice. See Utah Code
§75-1-304. By serving the Children's counsel, Barbara complied with URCP Rule 5.
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recover the distributed property, Ms. Mageras and Ms. Uzelac filed their own
memorandum asking the trial court to deny the motion. R.954-967 ("Memorandum in
Opposition to Barbara Uzelac's Motion for an Order Directing Beneficiaries to Return
Estate Property to the Estate, or in the Alternative voiding the Deed of Distribution").
In addition, the Children also filed petitions for affirmative relief both before and
after they filed their memorandum in opposition, and they gave notice of their petitions as
required by URCP Rule 5. See R.874-85 (Motion to Compel filed May 20, 2003);
R. 1243-48 (Petition for Appointment of Successor Personal Representative dated filed
December 9, 2003). Each of their petitions was a separate proceeding. Utah Code §753-106.
The trial court also stated that Barbara filed her Motion for recovery as a creditor
and implied that was fatally defective. R.1755. At the time she filed, Barbara was a
creditor. She did not lose her status as a creditor until the trial court ruled on the
affirmative defense that her claim was untimely, holding instead that Barbara was a
beneficiary of the will. R.1345. Moreover, in his opposition memorandum, the Personal
Representative affirmatively acknowledged that Barbara was a beneficiary. R.943-44.
Neither the Personal Representative nor the Children raised this defense in their original
arguments. R.942-58 (Personal Representative's memorandum); R.959-67 (Children's
memorandum).
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Section 75-3-105 grants "interested persons" the right to file for relief. There is no
requirement that the "interested person" must correctly identify the basis of their interest.
Holding that Barbara's failure to state she was also entitled to the same relief wearing a
different hat is a classic example of putting form over substance. It makes the grant of
plenary power to Utah probate courts "to administer justice in the matters that come
before it" ring hollow indeed. Certainly, the Children were not prejudiced by Barbara's
failure to identify both of her hats upon the filing of the Motion. They had enough notice
to file their own memorandum in opposition. R.959-67
Thus, contrary to the trial court's ruling, Barbara properly initiated a,proceeding in
which she filed a written request for an order compelling the Children to return the
distributed property to the estate as specifically authorized by Section 75-3-105, Section
75-3-909, Section 75-3-1004, and Section 75-3-1006. Once Barbara gave notice to the
Children's counsel, the trial court had both subject matter and in personam jurisdiction to
enter Barbara's prayer for relief. In refusing to enter that order, the trial court erred,
causing the Children to be unjustly enriched and denying Barbara the protection of Utah
law authorizing the recovery of improperly distributed assets. Accordingly, Barbara asks
the Court of Appeals to direct the trial court to order the Children to reconvey the
distributed property to the estate.
II.

The Court of Appeals Should Order Interest to Be Paid on the Devise to
Barbara.
In its initial Order dated April 5, 2004, the Court stated:
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"The Court further ruled at trial that Barbara is a beneficiary and not a creditor of
the Estate . . . . As such, the only issue remaining at trial was the interpretation of
the Ante Nuptial Agreement's directive that on the death of the first spouse to die
all properties acquired by the parties" during the marriage pass to the survivor."
R. 1345. The Court of Appeals affirmed and held that the proper interpretation of the
Ante Nuptial Agreement gave Barbara rights as a devisee under the Will. In re Estate of
Uzelac, ^|14, ffl[15-21. Thus, the trial court violated the law of the case doctrine by ruling
on remand that "this is an action on the interpretation of an Ante Nuptial [A]greement
rather than a general pecuniary devise . . .." R. 1754.
But even if this were not the case, the trial court's ruling is erroneous. Utah law
expressly permitted Louis to incorporate by reference his and Barbara's Ante Nuptial
Agreement. "A writing in existence when a will is executed may be incorporated by
reference if the language of the will manifests this intent and describes the writing
sufficiently to permit its identification." Utah Code §75-2-510. Louis stated that Barbara
was "to receive per the terms of the anti(sic) nuptial agreement dated March 25, 1976 ..
.." That statement incorporated into the Will by reference the entire Ante Nuptial
Agreement. When the trial court interpreted the Ante Nuptial Agreement, it was doing so
only because it was part of the Will. Thus, when the trial court determined that Barbara
was entitled to a pecuniary amount of $230,660.90, it necessarily determined that was
Barbara's devise under the will. Accordingly, Barbara's devise is a general pecuniary
devise. See also Utah Code §75-2-606 (if the property devised to a specific devisee is not
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in the estate at the testator's death, under certain circumstances, "the specific devisee has
the right to a general pecuniary devise equal to the net sale price . . .." Emphasis added.)
Section 75-3-904 grants a general pecuniary devisee, like Barbara, interest on the
devise. "General pecuniary devises bear interest at the legal rate beginning one year after
the first appointment of a personal representative until payment, unless a contrary intent is
indicated by the will." There is no contrary intent in Louis' will, nor has one been argued
by the personal representative or the Children. Thus, Barbara asks the Court of Appeals
to order the trial court to add 10% interest from December 7, 2000 until the date of
payment. The trial court also erred when it awarded post judgment interest at the post
judgment interest rate after the Judgment was entered. R. 1758. Section 75-3-904
specifically requires interest to be paid "until payment," not until the date of any
judgment. Id.
III.

Louis' Devise of "All of My Property" to his Children Was a Residuary
Devise.
A.

The Trial Court's Flawed Ruling.

The trial court ruled that Louis' devise of "all of my property" was "distributed as
a general devise to the daughters .. .." because "Restatement of Property (Wills), §5.1"
states "a devise of'all my property' is a general devise." R.1754, ^[2; fn. 1. However,
Section 5.1 of the Restatement does not state this. Restatement (Third) of Property, Wills
and Donative Transactions, §5.1 (1999, current through September 2006). Rather, it is
the Comments to Section 5.1 that state:
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Any devise that is payable out of the general assets of the estate is a general
devise. For example, a devise of "all of my property" or of "all of my
personal property" is a general devise, as is a devise of "one-half of my
estate."
Id. §5.1, Comment c. General devises. Comment g. to Section 5.1 of the Restatement
notes that no rule in Section 5.1 is set in stone. "The category into which a particular
devise falls is a question of construction, on which the testator's overall purpose is
relevant." §5.1, Comment g. Utah law supports Comment g. Utah Code §75-3-902(2) (in
determining the category into which each devise is classified for abatement purposes
express or implied direction in the will controls).7
B.

Louis Intended His Devise of "All of My Property"to His Children to
Be a Residuary Devise.

Utah law does not define a residuary devise for purposes of the abatement statute.
Utah Code §75-2-902. However, the text of the Restatement rule does so: "[A] residuary
devise is a testamentary disposition of property of the testator's net probate estate not
disposed by a specific, general, or demonstrative devise." Restatement (Third) of

7

Comment c is also misleading because a residuary devise is a type of general
devise. See "Bequest or devise of all testator's personal property or real property as
general or specific," 88 A.L.R. 553 (1934; "current by the weekly addition of relevant
new cases"). Thus, "whether a testamentary gift... is specific or general is to be
governed by the same rule . . . in the absence of a clearly expressed intention of the
testator to the contrary, a devise of. . . property in general terms, such as "all" of the
testator's property, or the "remainder" of the testator's property, will be held general,
rather than specific." Id., IILb. (emphasis added). Thus, stating a devise of "all my
property" is "general" distinguishes it from a specific devise, but not necessarily from a
residuary devise.
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Property, supra, §5.1(d). In the present case, if the devise of "all of my property" were a
general devise rather than a residuary devise, the devises to Barbara and the grandchildren
would be nullities. One cannot give and deliver all of anything to one party, and then,
following delivery, give part of that gift to someone else. Even the personal
representative acknowledged this indisputable fact in his post Trial Brief:
The Estate has never asserted that Barbara has no entitlements under the Ante
Nuptial Agreement. Nor has the Estate asserted that the fact that Lou[is] listed the
distribution to his daughters first meant that no other beneficiary, including
Barbara and [Louis'] grandchildren, was entitled to a distribution under the
[Louis'] Will. In fact, as the Estate clearly states in its [pre] Trial Brief, and as
Barbara acknowledges, the Estate's interpretation recognizes that [Louis] did not
intend the distributions to his daughters and his granddaughters to cut into
Barbara's distribution either.
R.l 174-75. A residuary devise to the Children will not "cut into" Barbara's devise
because the devise of "all of my property" is a devise of the property remaining after
paying Barbara and the grandchildren their general devises. In the words of the
Restatement, Louis' devise of "all of my property" to the Children constitutes a devise of
Louis' "net probate estate" after the devises to Barbara and to Louis' grandchildren have
been paid. Restatement (Third) of Property, supra, §5.1(d).
C.

Considering What Happens to Lapse Devises Further Shows That the
Devise to the Children Was a Residuary Devise.

As a matter of will construction, absent a finding that the testator intended a
different result, Utah law recognizes that it is the intent of testators to devise all of their
property in their wills. Utah Code §75-2-601; §75-2-602. Thus, "[a] will is construed to
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pass all property the testator owned at death . . .." Utah Code §75-2-602. Having stated
that he wanted all of his property to be distributed to his children, Louis' will certainly
does not evidence an intent contrary to this rule of construction. But what happens to this
rule if the devise to the children is a general devise? Since there would then be no
residuary devise, z/any part of the devises to Barbara and the grandchildren failed, the
assets comprising that devise would fall into intestacy because there would be no
residuary devise. Utah Code §75-2-604 (describing what happens when a devise lapses).
For example, if one of the grandchildren predeceased Louis and had no surviving
descendants, that devise would lapse. Utah Code §75-2-603(2). As a lapsed devise, it
would be paid to the residue of the estate. Utah Code §75-2-604(1). Without a residuary
clause, the lapsed devise and any other property in the residue of the estate is payable to
Louis' intestate heirs. AMJUR Wills §1445 "Devolution of Lapsed or Ineffectual Gifts."
In intestacy, Barbara would take the first $50,000 plus one half of the rest of the property.
Utah Code §75-2-102. Rather than receiving all of the property as the residuary devisees,
the Children would receive only one half the property remaining after Barbara received
the first $50,000.00 that fell into the residue. Utah Code §75-2-103.
Under the Ante Nuptial Agreement, Louis granted Barbara certain benefits in
paragraphs 2, 3, and 4. T. Exh. 1 at 2. Had any of these rights lapsed as a result of
Barbara's neglect, the amount of money representing that lapse would be payable to the
residuary estate. There is no basis for arguing that Louis intended lapse devises to be
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distributed in intestacy. Logically, he intended what remained after Barbara and his
Grandchildren's devises were paid to be paid to his Children as the residuary
beneficiaries of his estate - exactly as the personal representative acknowledged in his
post Trial Brief.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should reverse this erroneous ruling and order
the trial court to treat the devise to the Children as a residuary devise on remand.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The trial court erred in holding that Barbara had failed to initiate a proceeding to
recover the property distributed to the Children prior to the resolution of Barbara's. By
defending the estate from Barbara's claims for over seven years, by refusing to
acknowledge Barbara's rights until compelled to do so by this Court, and by distributing
the very property that would pay Barbara her entitlement, the personal representative and
now the Children have made her devise valueless. If there is to be justice for Barbara in
this case, that ruling cannot be allowed to stand.
The trial court failed to grant pre-distribution interest because it failed to recognize
that it was interpreting Louis' will, since Louis incorporated the Ante Nuptial Agreement
into his will by reference. Thus, the trial court was interpreting Barbara's devise in
Louis' will. Thus, the devise to Barbara "per the terms of the anti (sic) nuptial
agreement," was a specific amount of cash and a general pecuniary devise. Barbara is
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entitled to pre-distribution interest by law, and she asks this Court to order the trial court
to grant her prejudgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum until paid.
Finally, the trial court's ruling that the Children's devise was a general devise
based on a comment to that effect in Section 5.1 of the Restatement (Third) of Property,
supra, ignores the specific language of Section 5.1(d) of the Restatement and Comment g.
Further, the personal representative admitted that the devise of "all of my property"
operated as a residuary clause because it would not "cut into" the devises to Barbara and
the Grandchildren. In this holographic will, Louis intended to distribute all of his
property at death, and by ruling the devise to the Children is a residuary devise, that intent
is fulfilled. Thus, Barbara asks the court, to reverse the trial court and hold that the devise
to the Children is a residuary devise.
Dated thiguj day of December, 2006.
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC

Charles M/Bennett
Attorneys for Barbara B. Uzelac
H:\CMB\PLEADINGS ETC\UZELAC-APPELLATE-BRIEF 12-2006-FINAL.BRF
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S
BRIEF were mailed by first class to the following persons, t h i s / ^ _ day of December,
2006:
Margaret H. Olson
Hobbs & Olson
466 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
with one courtesy copy to:
Joseph G. Uzelac, Jr.
535 West Sweetwater Avenue
Phoenix, AZ 85029
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ANTE NUPTIAL AGREEMENT
This Ante Nuptial Agreement made this £~ 3

day of

March, 1976, by and between LOUIS J. UZELAC of Salt Lake City,
Utah, hereinafter referred to as Louis, and BARBARA BOWDEN of
Salt Lake City, Utah, hereinafter referred to as Barbara,
W I T N E S S E T H ,
WHEREAS, Louis and Barbara are contemplating marriage,
and
WHEREAS, Louis was previously married, which marriage
was terminated by the death of his wife, and
WHEREAS, Louis during said prior marriage acquired
certain real and personal properties, and
WHEREAS, Louis had as issue of said marriage two children
to-wit:

SUSAN BROOKE MAGERAS and ALLYSON D. UZELAC, and
WHEREAS, Barbara was previously married which marriage

was terminated by the death of her husband, and
WHEREAS, Barbara acquired during her previous marriage
certain real and personal properties, arid
WHEREAS, Barbara had as issue of her said previous
marriage one child, to-wit:

ELIZABETH BOWDEN, and

WHEREAS, Louis and Barbara are desirious of intermarrying, but both wish to protect the interests of their heirs
at law in and to the property acquired by the respective parties
during their lives, and
WHEREAS, the parties wish to define and make definate
the property interests of each of them with respect to the other's
property, and
WHEREAS, the parties desire to put into written form
their understanding with respect to the disposition of their
respective properties,
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the
inter-marriage of the parties it is hereby agreed by and between
the parties as follows:

1

1.

In the event of the termination of this marriage by

2 death or otherwise all of the real, personal or mixed property
3 owned by each party hereto prior to the marriage shall be the sole
4 and separate property of him and her or their respective estates
5 and that each party hereto agrees to execute and deliver to the
6 other or his or her estate a quit-claim deed in and to all real,
7 personal or mixed property owned by him or her prior to the marri8 age.
9

In the event that said quit-claim deeds are not executed

this Agreement shall suffice as an adequate quit-claim deed for

10 said purpose.
11

2.

Each party hereto agrees to insure the life of the

12 other with a life insurance policy or name the other as a benefic13 iary to receive from the proceeds from existing policies upon the
u z:
o 3•

14 life of the other the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000).
15

3.

In the event of the termination of the marriage by

16 death or otherwise, Louis agrees to provide supplemental health
17 and accident insurance coverage equal to that now provided by the

i5.s
<

18 U.S. Government which will be lost by Barbara by reason of said
19 marriage; in addition, to pay all moving costs from the dwelling
20 house of the parties back to her own property; that in addition
21 thereto, she shall have, in the event of the death of Louis, the
22 right to reside in the dwelling house of the parties for her life23 time, or such shorter time as she may elect however in the event
24 that she should remarry then she shall move therefrom within a
25 reasonable time back to her own separate property.
26

4.

It is further agreed that in the event that Barbara

27 is unable to requalify for certain income payments that she is now
28 receiving from an annuity policy being paid to her by the United
29 States of America that the estate of Louis, or Louis, shall pay
30 to Barbara in monthly payments or in a lump sum, reduced to its
31

then present value such sum of money as she would lose until such

32 time as she could requalify for payments under said annuity.
33

5.

The parties further agree that all property, whether

34 real, personal or mixed acquired by the parties shall go to the
-2-

1

survivor, in the event of the death of the other, or if otherwise

2

terminated, shall be equitably divided as the parties may agree or

3

as may be decreed by a court of competent

4
5

6.

jurisdiction.

Paragraph 5 is subject to the provisions of paragraph

9 of this Agreement.

6

7.

In the event of simultaneous death of the parties

7

to this Agreement it is agreed by the parties that the property

8

owned by Louis prior to his marriage shall be distributed to his

9

heirs at law, share and share alike.

The property owned by Barbara

10

prior to her marriage shall go to her heirs at law, share and share]

11

alike.
8.

12

In the event of the simultaneous death of the parties'

13

all property acquired by them during their marriage, be it real,

14

personal or mixed shall be divided one-half to Barbara's estate

15

and one-half to Louis' estate.
9.

16

In the event that either party to this Agreement

17

should sell, convert or exchange any of the property owned by

18

him or her prior to the marriage, then the proceeds from such sale

19

or exchange or such other real or personal property acquired from

20

such sale shall be deemed subject to this Agreement, not as

21

property acquired during the marriage, but as substitute property

22

owned by the party prior to marriage.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereunto have set their

23
24

hands and seals the date first above written.

25
26
27
!•

28

f^jt^^yl^t:^
BARBARA BOWDEN

Witness

29<
30
31
32
33

-334
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Tab 3

Third Judicial District

AUG 1 0 2006
r
SALT LAKE COUNTY

f~\

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF: LOUIS J. UZELAC,
Deceased

Probate No. 993901690
Judge L.A. Dever

The above entitled matter came before the Court on remand from the Court of
Appeals. The parties briefed the issues addressed by the Court of Appeals and
submitted memoranda in support of their respective positions.
After considering the arguments and memoranda, the Court finds as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Louis Uzelac and Barbara Bowden were married in the spring of 1976. Prior
to their marriage, the parties entered into an Ante Nuptial Agreement. The agreement
provided for their separate properties to remain separate and that neither party had a
claim to the other's pre-marital property.
2. Mr. Uzelac died in November of 1999. Barbara Uzelac claimed that she was
entitled to all property acquired by the parties during the marriage. She also claimed to
be a creditor of the Estate.
3. This Court ruled against her on both claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed

the dismissal of the creditor claim but reversed on the claim to acquired property.
4. The Estate and Mrs. Uzelac stipulated that the only property acquired by Mr.
Uzelac that is subject to her claim is the cash (including stocks) on hand at his death.
5. The parties entered into a stipulation of facts outlining the cash deposits and
stock held by Mr. Uzelac.
a. The parties stipulated that cash on deposit at the time of his death was
$277,716.00.
b. The parties agreed that there were nine named stocks held by him at
his death.
i. stock under the control of the Estate at the time of Mr. Uzelac's
death was valued at $15,409.53. All stock under the control of the Estate, less the
defunct oil companies listed below, was sold on December 20, 2001.
ii. stock under the control of Mrs. Uzelac was transferred to the
Estate on July 3, 2003. The value of the stock at the time of the transfer to the Estate
was $18,097.18. Two dollars is deducted below as that was the value of pre-marital
stock in her possession. At the time of Mr. Uzelac's death the value was $21,541.38.
6. On the list are stocks for defunct oil mineral exploration companies valued by
the Estate as de minimis. No information as to when these were purchased has been
presented therefore any claim that they are after-acquired stock has not been shown.
Based on the fact of no established value and no date of acquisition these stocks are

2

not included.
7. Stock owned by Mr. Uzelac prior to his marriage should be removed from the
list of stocks, pursuant to the Ante Nuptial Agreement. These stocks are Lucent
Technology, AT&T, Alliance Capital and Evergreen Funds. On the date of death the
value of these stocks was $4,757.38.
8. The value of after acquired stock, at the at the date of death and under control
of the Estate, was $9,652.15.
9. The total value of the after-acquired stock is $27,747.33. The Court reached
this amount by totaling the value of stock under the control of the Estate at the date of
death, $9,652.15, and the value of the stock held by Mrs. Uzelac at the time she
transferred it to the Estate, $18,095.18. The Court determines that it is correct to value
the stock transferred to the Estate at the time of transfer rather than the date of death.
The Estate can not be held to the date of death value when Mrs. Uzelac maintained
control over the stock at issue for more than 2 34 years after the date of death.
10. The value of the after acquired property, subject to claim under the AnteNuptial Agreement is the total of the money accounts and the after-acquired stock. This
amount is $277,716.00 + $27,747.33 = $305,463.33.
11. Mrs. Uzelac claims that the value of gifts made by Mr. Uzelac to his
daughters and grandchildren during the marriage should be included in the total estate.
Accepting her calculations as correct, the amount averaged over the 23 year marriage
would be $2569.00 a year. That amount does not appear to be an outrageous or even
substantial sum given the fact that he had over $300,000.00 in liquid assets. There is
no evidence of a substantial transfer to his children or grandchildren just prior to his
3

death that would trigger a suspicion that he intended to deprive his wife of anything due
her. The Court determines that the claim for the return of the gifts to his children and
grandchildren is without merit.
12. From the total after acquired property certain deductions must be made.
The parties stipulated that the following sums should be deducted:
a. $15,000.00 given to Mrs. Uzelac just prior to the death of Mr. Uzelac.
b. The POD account in Mrs. Uzelac's name in the sum of $12,790.00.
c. $52,012.43 in Mr. Uzelac's name at the time of the marriage.
These sums total $79,802.43.
13. Two issues have been raised concerning two of these deductions. Mrs.
Uzelac claims the POD account should be reduced by $5,000.00 because that sum was
owed to her for an insurance policy that was part of the Ante Nuptial agreement. It is
clear that Mr. Uzelac intended that the value of the insurance policy was to be included
in the POD account in question. Therefore, $5,000 will be deducted from the total to be
applied against the claim of Mrs. Uzelac.
The second issue concerns whether interest should be added to the $52,012.43
of pre-marital money. It is clear from the Ante Nuptial agreement that separate property
was to remain separate and therefore any increases in value likewise would be
separate. However, no evidence has been presented as to the amount that sum would
have earned either by actual interest rates or the government bond rate typically used
when evidence of actual interest amounts is unavailable. The deduction will be limited
to the $52,012.43.
14. The amount of after acquired property is $305,463.33 minus $74,802.43 for
4

a total of $230,660.90. A judgment for that amount will enter, plus post-judgment
interest at the rate in effect from the date of judgment. Date of judgment is the
appropriate starting place for interest since this is an action on the interpretation of the
Ante Nuptial agreement rather than a general pecuniary devise as alleged by the
petitioner. The requirements for imposition of pre-judgment interest have not been met.
15. In order to satisfy her claim, Mrs. Uzelac contends that the proper course
would be for the Court to compel the return to the Estate of Mr. Uzeiac's pre-marital real
property; sell it, give her credit for her life estate and then pay her the judgment.

CONCLUSIONS
1. The payment to Mrs. Uzelac should be from the assets of the Estate but for
the reasons noted below, the real property of Mr. Uzelac is not available as that source.
2. The real property in question was distributed as a general devise to the
daughters of Mr. Uzelac, on May 29,2003.1
3. Under the provisions of the Utah Probate Code, §75-3-1006, the claim of any
claimant to recovery property improperly distributed or the value thereof from any
distributee is barred at the later of three years after the decedent's death or one year
after the time of distribution thereof. Mr Uzelac died November 6, 1999, the property
was distributed May 29,2003.
1

At first blush, it may appear that the daughters are residual devisees, but in fact they are general devisees.
As noted in the Restatement of Property (Wills) §5.1, a general devise is a testamentary disposition, usually of a
specified amount of money or quantity of property. As pointed out in that section, a devise of "all my property" is a
general devise. A residuary devise is a disposition of the testator's property not disposed of by a specific, general or
demonstrative devise. Mr. Uzeiac's will does not have a residuary clause.
5

4. Under §75-3-1004 of the Probate Code, after the assets of an estate have
been distributed, and subject to §75-3-1006, an undischarged claim not barred may be
prosecuted in a proceeding against one or more of the distributees.
5. The daughters were granted the right to intervene on November 17, 2005, in
order to respond to the claim for recovery made by Mrs. Uzelac, which claim had been
made against the Estate.
6. It is clear that no proceedings against either of the distributees of the real
property requested by to be recovered has been instituted. The claim of Mrs. Uzelac
that her claim as a creditor of the Estate was sufficient to put the daughters on notice is
not well taken. The statute is clear that the action must be against the distributees, not
the Estate.
Therefore, Mrs. Uzelac's claim for the recovery of the real property distrubuted
on May 29,2003, to Brooke Mageras and Allyson Uzelac, is denied.

Dated this

\Q day of August, 2006.

BY THE COURT

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order and
Judgment on the 10 day of August, 2006, to the following:

MARGARET H. OLSON
HOBBS & OLSON
466 East 500 South, Ste 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
CHARLES M. BENNETT
BLACKBURN & STOLL, L.C.
77 West 200 South, Ste 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1609
JOE UZELAC, JR.
535 Sweetwater Avenue
Phoenix, AZ 85029

Deputy Court Clerk
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JUDGMENT

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF:

Probate No. 993901M)0
LOUIS J. UZELAC
Judge Dever
Deceased.

On remand, the Court accepted memoranda from the parties, heard oral argument on the
issue of damages and matters related thereto, and supplemented the record. On August 12, 2006,
the Court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Having issued its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, the Court is now prepared to enter its Judgment.

WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The Court enters Judgment in favor of Barbara B. Uzelac and against the Estate of

Louis J. Uzelac in the amount of $230,660.00.
2.

However, the Court denies the Motion of Barbara Uzelac for an order requiring the

Susan Brooke Mageras and Allyson D. Uzelac to return the real property that was distributed on
May 29, 2003. That real property shall not be property of the estate for purposes of this judgment.
Judgment @J

Page i
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993901690

JD20593722
ESTATE OF LOUIS J UZELAC,

3.

The Court denies Barbara B Uzelac's request ior prejudgment interest.

4

Upon entry of this Judgment, post judgment interest shall accrue until the Judgment

has been paid in full
DATED this

H

ft^Qfe**day of
BY THE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
HOBBS & OLSON

i-£L_

Margaret H. Olson
Attorneys for Susan Brooke Mageras and
Allyson D. Uzelac
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I IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 1 NOTICE OF APPEAL
LOUIS J. UZELAC,
||

Deceased.

1

Probate No. 993901690
1 Judge Dever

||

Barbara B. Uzelac, through her attorneys, Blackburn & Stoll, LC and Charles M. Bennett,
hereby files this Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. On August 10, 2006, the Third
District Court enter an untitled pleading that appeared to have been the Court's findings of fact
and conclusions of law in the above entitled matter. On September 8, 2006, Ms. Uzelac filed a
Notice of Appeal for protective purposes because she was unsure whether the trial court intended
its August 10, 2006 ruling to be a Judgment in the matter. However, on September 11, 2006, the
trial court entered its Judgment and confirmed that its August 10th ruling was its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law. Thus, Ms. Uzelac files this Notice of Appeal as to parts of the
Judgment and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Ms. Uzelac appeals the following parts of the trial court's Judgment and Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law:
1.

The Court's ruling denying Ms. Uzelac's Motion for the return of the estate

property so that her bequest could be paid (Judgment, ^2 at 1);
Page 1

2.

The Court's ruling that Ms. Uzelac was not entitled to prejudgment interest on the

amount to which the Court determined she was entitled (Judgment. | 3 at 2); and
3.

The Court's ruling that the decedent's children were "general devisees" under the

decedent's will (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated August 10, 2006, %L at
5).
This is the second appeal that Ms. Uzelac has taken in this case. In the first appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court. Ms. Uzelac posted a cost
bond in that first appeal. However, that cost bond has never been returned. Therefore, Ms.
Uzelac requests the Court waive a cost bond in this appeal and use the previous cost bond for
purpose of URAP Rule 6.
Dated this / ^ d a y of September, 2006.
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC

Attorneys ror Barbara B. Uzelac
H\CMB\PLEADINGS ETQUZEIAC-NOTICE-APPEAL NOT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL
was mailed to the following person this { p day of September, 2006:
Margaret H. Olson
Hobbs & Olson
525 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Joseph G. Uzelac, Jr.
Personal Representative of the Estate of Louis J. Uzelac
535 West Sweetwater Avenue
Phoenix, AZ 85029
Angela Marie Mageras
4200 East Lodewyck Drive
Las Vegas, NY 89121
Amanda D. Mageras
4200 East Lodewyck Drive
Las Vegas, NV 89121
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